

Secure PTP Using TLS Key Management

a proposal by
Douglas Arnold
Meinberg-USA

Agenda

Terminology

PTP AUTHENTICATION TLV

Network Time Security

TLS Key Exchange

PTP with NTS

Summary

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First two stages of grieving about lack of network timing security

1. Denial

- Me: “Are you interested in security for timing protocols?”
- Network operator: “No. Our network is very secure.”
- Me: “Call me after something bad happens.”
- Perhaps network security and timing are handled by different groups in a large organization. And they don’t talk to each other.

2. Anger

- Network operator: “What security is there for NTP and PTP?”
- Me: “NTP has an obsolete security mechanism, and PTP has nothing yet.”
- Network operator: “What the heck are you standards people doing?”

Transport Layer Security (TLS)

- Cryptographic network security protocol
- Used in web browsing, email, messaging, and VoIP

Network Time Security (NTS)

- Draft IETF RFC approved for publication
- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp/>
- Adaptation of TLS for unicast mode client-server NTP
- Time server manufacturers are going to implement this


Authentication TLV

- TLV = Type length value, a standard method for extending network messages
- PTP message extension for message integrity protection and possibly source authentication
- Defined in IEEE 1588-2019
- Requires a yet unspecified key management system to secure PTP
- NTS key management could be adapted for unicast PTP

PTP Authentication TLV



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Security Parameter Pointer

- Indicates a specific entry in a security association database
- Allows a PTP instance to have secure communications with multiple network elements - for example a slave talking to a grandmaster and a monitoring node

Security Parameter Indicator

- Flags field indicating whether optional fields are present
- We don't need any of the optional fields for NTS
- Set to all zeros

Key ID

- Indicates which key is being used
- Points to an entry in the security association database

ICV

- Integrity Check Value
- A hash code

Starts with TLS Key Establishment (KE) Server

- Needed to start
- Then client and server continue without KE server

Properties of NTS

- NTP servers are stateless: don't save data about any specific client
- Works only for unicast NTP
- Includes and ICV (hash code)
- Includes encryption
 - Needed to transfer keys, not to protect timestamps


PTP profile which could use NTS

- Unicast with negotiation
- IPv4 or IPv6 mapping

TLS Key Exchange Server



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S2M Cookie TLV

- ID of current S2M key
- ID of current M2S key (if different)
- Negotiated algorithm and parameters

M2S Cookie TLV (Send encrypted)

- Next keys and IDs
- Negotiated algorithm and parameters

The cookie scheme allows NTP servers to not keep state for each client


- NTP servers can have a very large numbers of clients
- NTP servers do keep keys in a list with index numbers
- PTP master ports keep data on slaves, but we retain this scheme so that NTS can secure both NTP and PTP



TLS Handshake for PTP



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


After initial shared cookie, master port generates new cookies


TLS Handshake for PTP



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Traditional Unicast PTP



Unicast PTP with NTS

NTS for NTP

- New security option to replace autokey
- Covers unicast client-server NTP only
- ~~Likely~~ Certain to be implemented in commercial time servers
- Uses TLS for algorithm negotiation and initial keys
- Subsequent keys generated by server

NTS for PTP

- Appropriate for layer 3 unicast PTP
- Cookies exchanged during announce message negotiation
- Keys used in AUTHENTICATION TLV

Dankeschön !!!

Questions and comments welcome:
doug.Arnold@meinberg-usa.com