Telecom Standards for Resilient Timing

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Agenda

- IEEE P1952 Project
- ITU-T Documents for timing
- ITU-T Defined resilient clocks
- Additional ITU-T resilience mechanisms
- Summary

GNSS vulnerability to jamming and spoofing

You've seen 100 versions of this slide at the WSTS, so let's move on

IEEE P1952 project

 Resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing User Equipment Working Group



- Project to create an IEEE standard
 - Standard for Resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing User Equipment


In Scope

- Requirements on behaviors of PNT User Equipment
- Defines levels of resilience for PNT UE

Out of scope

- Requirements on PNT source systems (e.g. GPS Constellation)
- UE design or technologies to achieve resilience levels

PNT User Equipment



P1952 has a very broad concept of "User"

Examples of P1952 User Equipment

Equipment

GNSS receiver

PRTC

Timing network

User

PRTC vendor

Timing architect

Network operator

P1952 Adversity Categories

 P1952 Resilience is focused on resilience to PNT adversities

Out of scope:

- General reliability
- Design flaws that do not affect PNT performance
- Power disruptions
- PNT adversities are: natural, unintentional or malicious disturbances of the PNT input signals

- Adversity Examples for timing systems:
 - GNSS jamming/interference
 - GNSS spoofing
 - GNSS ionospheric delay variation
 - GNSS system errors
 - PTP Asymmetry
 - PTP Rogue T-GMs
 - PTP message manipulation
 - PTP delay attacks
 - Loss of SyncE

P1952 Resilience Levels


Resilience level	Description
1. Detect and alert	Detect any adversity serious enough to cause the equipment to fail to meet its PNT output performance specifications
2. Recover automatically	When the adversity is no longer happening
3. Resist	Continue to meet minimum acceptable performance requirements for some time, i.e. holdover
4. Withstand	Continue to meet minimum performance requirements in steady state
5. Verify	Verify that the received PNT information is correct

Note Each resilience level also inherits the requirements from lower levels

P1952 status

- Work in progress
- Most normative clauses close to a complete draft
- Some informative clauses not started, and might not be included
- Language defining resilience levels mostly stable
- Clause on adversities went through working group ballot
- Full document ready for working group ballot by the end of the year


ITU-T Resilience Appendix



ITU-T defined primary clocks

		Imple- men-	Additional sources (external primary clocks)								
				external Frequency		external Phase/time					
Primary Source		tation variant number	None	PRC via high- accuracy time transfer	PRC via SyncE	Phase/time via high- accuracy time transfer	via PTP-FTS profile	via PTP- APTS profile	UTC(k)		
	PRTC (G.8272)	1	X								
1		2			X						
		3					x				
	ePRTC (G.8272.1)	4	х								
2		5			Х						
		6							Х		
2	cnPRTC	7	х								
3	(G.8272.2)	8							Х		

Primary clocks and resilience levels



IEEE P1952 Resilience Level			Proposal	threat duration time	PRTC			ePRTC			cnPRTC	
		ience Level			PRTC	PRTC with SyncE	PRTC with APTS	ePRTC	ePRTC with SyncE	ePRTC with UTC(k)	cnPRTC	cnPRTC with UTC(k)
1	Detect Alert	The ability to detect an adversity that might impact performance and generate an alert.	With the available on- board resources of the specific primary clock variants, resilience level 1 should be met without restrictions.		x	х	ж	ж	х	ж	х	x
2	Recover	The ability to automatically recover and operate normally after an adversity.	With the available on- board resources of the specific primary clock variants, resilience level 2 should be met without restrictions.		х	х	х	х	х	х	х	х
3 Resist		The ability to operate during an adversity, perhaps with reduced performance, but still within specifications, for a	consider the maximul lenght of time for fulfillment of resilience level 3.	<< 1 day	х	x	х	x	х	х	x	x
	Resist			1 - 40 days	-	based	based	×	х	x	x	x
	'	specified length of		> 40 days	-	on SyncE	on PTS	-	based on PRC via SyncE	x	(x)	x
4	With- stand	Withstand: The ability to operate during an adversity, perhaps with reduced performance, but still within specifications, indefinitely.	A indefinitely withstand can be guarantied with usage of external UTC(k) only.			-						х
5	Verify	The ability to determine that information from a PNT source is accurate.	A indefinitely withstand can be guarantied with usage of external UTC(k) only.		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	х

Beyond primary references

IEEE P1952 Resilience Level	Mitigation mechanism	ITU-T Recommendations	Relevant adversities				
1 Detect	1 Detect Monitoring		PTP asymmetry, PTP delay attacks				
1 Alert	Management	Under study	Alladversities				
2 Recover	Under study Under study		Alladversities				
3 Resist	Holdover, SyncE	G.8272, G.8272.1, G.8275.2, G.781	GNSS jamming, GNSS spoofing if detected, PTP protocol attacks if detected				
4 Withstand	АРТР	G.8271.2, Appendix I	GNSS jamming, GNSS spoofing if detected				
4 Withstand	timeTransmitter only ports	G.8275, Annex E	PTP protocol attacks				
5 Verify	APTP	G.8271.2, Appendix I	PTP asymmetry, PTP delay attacks				

Possible future work for Q13/15 on resilience:

- Guidelines for GNSS receivers and antennas to mitigate jamming and spoofing.
- PTP security (this work is already started).
- Expand architecture for use of multiple time sources to support voting algorithms (this work is already started).

Summary

- IEEE P1952 Project
 - Defines Resilience levels for PNT User Equipment
 - Behaviors equipment should exhibit when PNT inputs experience adversities
- ITU-T Resiliency Appendix
 - Tables pointing to ITU recommended:
 - network architectures
 - technologies
 - specifications
 - That could be used to achieve the various P1952 resilience levels

Thank you for your attention

If you do not get your questions answered in the Q&A Pannel, find us in the coffee break or send me email:

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