Resilience Evaluation for Timing Systems

Dr. Bradley A. Moran, Dr. Patricia Larkoski Homeland Security Systems Engineering & Development Institute, operated by The MITRE Corporation

Presentation on 14 Mar 2023 at Workshop on Synchronization and Timing Systems (WSTS)



Acknowledgement for DHS Sponsored Tasks

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Section 305 of PL 107-296, as codified in 6 U.S.C. 185), herein referred to as the "Act," authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, to establish one or more federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) to provide independent analysis of homeland security issues. MITRE Corp. operates the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI) as an FFRDC for DHS under contract 70RSAT20D00000001.

The HSSEDI FFRDC provides the government with the necessary systems engineering and development expertise to conduct complex acquisition planning and development; concept exploration, experimentation and evaluation; information technology, communications and cyber security processes, standards, methodologies and protocols; systems architecture and integration; quality and performance review, best practices and performance measures and metrics; and, independent test and evaluation activities. The HSSEDI FFRDC also works with and supports other federal, state, local, tribal, public and private sector organizations that make up the homeland security enterprise. The HSSEDI FFRDC's research is undertaken by mutual consent with DHS and is organized as a set of discrete tasks. This report presents the results of research and analysis conducted under:

70RSAT20FR0000062, Next Gen Resilient Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), to develop and maintain the Nation's technical expertise, frameworks and artifacts necessary to guide users, product integrators and supply chain manufacturers on government expectations related to PNT system resilience.

The results presented in this report do not necessarily reflect official DHS opinion or policy.

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 23-0229 / DHS reference number 70RSAT20FR-062-06





Critical Infrastructure Depends on Resilient Timing

- CI Sectors and related systems depend widely on PN<u>T</u>, especially <u>T</u>
 - Use cases for both standalone Timing and full Positioning, Navigation & Timing
 - GNSS, particularly GPS, widely relied on for precise time synchronization
 - Impact of source degradation / loss often not well understood
- Application-specific use cases drive needs
 - Performance bounds (accuracy, availability), threats & disruptions
 - Resilience is the ability to meet performance bounds when subject to specific threat scenarios



Chemical, Communications, Emergency Services, Energy, Financial, Food & Agriculture, Information Technology Transportation Systems are some of the Critical Infrastructure Sectors vital to the United States



Resilience Milestones and Beyond



P1952 Purpose and Scope

P1952 is a voluntary IEEE industry standard, intended

- to develop common language that describes resilience of PNT user equipment for end users, suppliers, and government agencies seeking improvements for Critical Infrastructure
- to be implementation neutral
- P1952 Project Authorization Request (PAR) focus on user equipment vs upstream infrastructure
 - GNSS space and control segments, for example, out of scope
 - Details available from IEEE SA (<u>https://development.standards.ieee.org/myproject-web/public/view.html#pardetail/9060</u>)
 - Success hinges on ability to evaluate PNT user equipment with respect to resilience standard



5

Resilient User Equipment Encountering a Threat



- Aspects of resilient behavior for user equipment (UE) when encountering threat or disruption
 - Prevention: what passive UE capabilities might prevent adverse impact on operation?
 - Detection & Response: After the threat begins, how do we know the UE has detected and responded appropriately? How long does it take?
 - Performance: how well does UE maintain performance while the threat persists?
 - Recovery: can the UE recover nominal performance after the threat is over?



Scenario Specific Resilience Evaluation

<i>How well?</i> Measure performance	 Performance during the threat Degree of degradation Duration of degradation Performance after the threat 	only option for passive prevention measures
How quickly? Assess responsiveness	 Detection delay Lag between detection and response Lag between threat end and recovery Recovery time 	initiation
<i>How explicitly?</i> Examine internal state	 Threat detection alerts Response indicators Performance quality reporting (includi Recovery notification 	ng assurance and/or integrity)



Resilient PNT Reference Architecture

PNT Source(s)

- Quantity & diversity, independence

Resilience Functions

- Threat detection
- System response
- Recovery

PNT Solution Synthesis

- Compensation terms
- Blending
- Output drivers

Many opportunities for UE to provide evidence of resilient behavior in output performance and reportable internal state change events



Resilient PNT Evaluation Infrastructure

Developing a modular toolkit to evaluate PNT resilience

- Provides user command, scenario generation, PNT source emulation, logging and analysis
- Demonstrating evaluation of resilience approaches described in the Reference Architecture
 - Initial focus on timing systems with detectable time ramp threat scenarios





Lab Setup for Continuous Resilience Demonstration





HSSEDI is a trademark of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The HSSEDI FFRDC is managed and operated by The MITRE Corporation for DHS.

Resilience Demonstration Results

Input scenario

- 1 hr nominal, 2 hr threat, ...
- Measurement spoof on GPS constellation, time ramp ~25 ns/s
- GLONASS undisturbed

Resilient vs baseline behavior

- Solution walks off when ensemble includes all input sources
- Resilient system isolates GPS from solution, showing minor degradation that remains bounded
- Recovery includes re-integration of GPS source



Resilience Metrics Verified in Demonstration

rice

	Eunctional & Performance Metrics		Initial	1.0 ns
How well? Measure	 Bounded degradation during the threat 	RMS Error	During threat	2.6 ns
performance	 System performance recovery after the threat Automatic source recovery after the threat 		Post recovery	1.2 ns
How quickly?	Delay Metrics	Response	Threat detection	3 s
Assess responsiveness	 Inreat detection delay Recovery initiation time 	times	Recovery initiation	46 s

Reporting Metrics

How explicitly?

Examine internal state

- Threat detection reporting
- Threat response reporting when compromised PNT source isolated from ensemble solution
- System recovery reporting when PNT source returned to ensemble



Considerations and Recommendations

For Resilient PNT End Users:

- What drives resilience requirements for your application, e.g., criticality, safety, regulatory?
- What evidence of resilient behavior do you need ...
 - In the user equipment to share with the application layer?
 - ... for the development team to satisfy regulatory requirements, if applicable?
- How well does the supply chain currently meet your needs?
- What dialog should you be having with developers?

For Resilient PNT Developers:

- What performance and threat use cases does your resilient solution address?
- What operational information, including internal state, can provide evidence to end users of resilient behavior?
- What messages and protocols to communicate resilience?
- Leverage existing? Develop novel? Collective development?



Backups



HSSEDI is a trademark of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The HSSEDI FFRDC is managed and operated by The MITRE Corporation for DHS.

Conformance Framework Evaluation Concepts

Understand Application of UE Being Evaluated

•Determine resilience level needed for this application.



 Identify existing industry resilience standards/requirements that must be considered in the evaluation.

Design Evaluation Process

- •Determine necessary evaluation methods.
- •Determine the relevant metrics.
- Establish pass/fail criteria
- •Develop evaluation procedure based on identified methods, metrics, and pass/fail criteria.



Overall Evaluation Process from Conformance Framework



Level 3 Reference Implementation Diagram



The HSSEDI FFRDC is managed and operated by The MITRE Corporation for DHS.

Test Framework Description

The Test Framework is a flexible test harness for resilience evaluation for 'black box' PNT Systems.



Test Framework Components

- User Configuration Command Controller (UCCC)
 - Allow the user to configure PNT resilience test scenario
 - Monitor and control test scenarios
 - Display logging and analysis data
 - Trigger reset and recovery of the resilient PNT system reference implementation under test

Scenario Controller

- Provide signal sources to the resilient PNT system reference implementation under test
- Enable controls of the signal sources (e.g., configure, start, and stop) in a threat scenario



meland Security Systems Engineering & De

Test Framework Components

Analysis Controller

- Compute and visualize error metrics
- Support real-time and post-test analysis

Logging Controller

 Log and parse data from both internal test framework components and PNT SUT



Publish/Subscribe Architecture

- All interfaces between the modules of the Test Framework will use a Publish Subscribe (pub/sub) design pattern (TCP/IP)
- The message payload of each pub/sub message (derived from a base Event class) will be in JSON format
 - supports numerous numeric and non-numeric data types
 - supports schema validation
 - serialization/deserialization libraries are native to Python
 - support rapid and flexible payload schema updates
 - supports rapid and flexible addition of new message types
 - human-readable payloads when deserialized
 - intrinsically well-suited to data logging in Python
- The rationale for selecting TCP/IP and the data transport protocol is to have a connection-based mechanism that guarantees delivery of the message



Scenario Description

Time Ramp Threat Scenario

- Skydel generates GPS and GLONASS RF
- Starts with 2 hours of nominal operation
- Then a 25 ns/s time ramp on GPS for 1 hour
- Then snaps back to nominal operation and runs for another 2 hours

Pseudorange Threat Configuration Window





Conformance Framework Level 3 PNT Resilience Requirements

Requirement Number	Requirement Text	Typical
Performance	Provides a solution (with bounded degradation) during threat.	performance
1	Must verify that stored data from external inputs adheres to values and formats of established standards.	
2	Must support full system recovery by manual means, making all memory clearable or resettable, enabling return to a proper working state, and returning the system to the defined performance after removal of the threat.	e ₁ Bounded performance degradation
3	Must include the ability to securely reload or update firmware.	e_0
4	Must identify compromised PNT sources and prevent them from contributing to erroneous PNT solutions.	present
5	Must support automatic recovery of individual PNT sources and system, without disrupting system PNT output.	t_1 t_2 t_3
6	Must ensure that corrupted data from one PNT source cannot corrupt data from another PNT source.	Threat Recovery
7	Must cross-verify between PNT solutions from all PNT sources.	

Requirements Evaluated with Performance Metrics

Requirement Number	Requirement Text	RI performance
Performance	Provides a solution (with bounded degradation) during threat.	2) RI
1	Must verify that stored data from external inputs adheres to values and formats of established standards.	performance
2	Must support full system recovery by manual means, making all memory clearable or resettable, enabling return to a proper working state, and returning the system to the defined performance after removal of the threat.	e_1 e_0 e_1
3	Must include the ability to securely reload or update firmware.	threat
4	Must identify compromised PNT sources and prevent them from contributing to erroneous PNT solutions.	t ₁ t ₂ t ₂
5	Must support automatic recovery of individual PNT sources and system, without disrupting system PNT output.	5) PNT source (GPS receiver)
6	Must ensure that corrupted data from one PNT source cannot corrupt data from another PNT source.	performance after the threat
7	Must cross-verify between PNT solutions from all PNT sources.	

Requirements Evaluated with Measures of Delay

Requirement Number	Requirement Text					
Performance	Provides a solution (with bounded degradation) during threat.			0) [
1	Must verify that stored data from external inputs adheres to values and formats of established standards.	+		2) f	time	ery
2	Must support full system recovery by manual means, making all memory clearable or resettable, enabling return to a proper working state, and returning the system to the defined performance after removal of the threat.	e_1			4	
3	Must include the ability to securely reload or update firmware.	0		threat		
4	Must identify compromised PNT sources and prevent them from contributing to erroneous PNT solutions.			present	+ +	
5	Must support automatic recovery of individual PNT sources and system, without disrupting system PNT output.	4) Detection time	ι1		ι ₂ ι	3
6	Must ensure that corrupted data from one PNT source cannot corrupt data from another PNT source.					
7	Must cross-verify between PNT solutions from all PNT sources.					

Requirements Evaluated with Reporting

Requirement Number	Requirement Text	1) 4) 7) Report when a threat or disruption is detected, and	
Performance	Provides a solution (with bounded degradation) during threat.	when the threat is no longer	
1*	Must verify that stored data from external inputs adheres to values and formats of established standards.	detected	
2	Must support full system recovery by manual means, making all memory clearable or resettable, enabling return to a proper working state, and returning the system to the defined performance after removal of the threat.	response to detected threats, such as removing a source from the	
3	Must include the ability to securely reload or update firmware.	ensemble	
4	Must identify compromised PNT sources and prevent them from contributing to erroneous PNT solutions.	2) 5) Report	
5	Must support automatic recovery of individual PNT sources and system, without disrupting system PNT output.	system recover steps, such a adding a sou	very as irce
6	Must ensure that corrupted data from one PNT source cannot corrupt data from another PNT source.	back into the ensemble wh	, nen
7*	Must cross-verify between PNT solutions from all PNT sources.	it is safe.	
	*Lovel 2 threat according door not too	HSSED	

HSSEDI is a trademark of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The HSSEDI FFRDC is managed and operated by The MITRE Corporation for DHS. *Level 3 threat scenario does not test this kind of threat detection

Requirements Evaluated with Static Analysis

equirement Number	Requirement Text
Performance	Provides a solution (with bounded degradation) during threat.
1	Must verify that stored data from external inputs adheres to values and formats of established standards.
2	Must support full system recovery by manual means, making all memory clearable or resettable, enabling return to a proper working state, and returning the system to the defined performance after removal of the threat.
3	Must include the ability to securely reload or update firmware.
4	Must identify compromised PNT sources and prevent them from contributing to erroneous PNT solutions.
5	Must support automatic recovery of individual PNT sources and system, without disrupting system PNT output.
6	Must ensure that corrupted data from one PNT source cannot
	Corrupt data from another PNT source.
7*	sources.

HSSEDI is a trademark of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The HSSEDI FFRDC is managed and operated by The MITRE Corporation for DHS. *Level 3 threat scenario does not test this kind of threat detection