

The Best Master Clock Algorithm


A proven way to **ALWAYS** provide a reference, why bother?

- ▲ Fully **autonomous** process
 - ▲ Triggered only if current Grandmaster **fails** or a “**better**” GM enters the network
 - ▲ All devices in a network will always select the **same** best Grandmaster
- ▶ Master Election takes **time**
 - ▶ **Hold over** performance of all end devices is critical
- ▶ What if the auxiliary PTP GM is not working?
 - ▶ GM(s) in stand-by have to be monitored separately
- ▶ Triggered **only** by Announce messages
- ▼ **Loss of PTP event messages remains undetected**
 - ▼ PTP event messages are manipulated within network elements!
- ▼ **Quality of time information is not taken into account**

Redundant Synchronization at the End Node

Use **multiple** time references simultaneously


- ▲ Process several PTP feeds independently from each other
- ▲ Multiple PTP instances attached to distinct PTP ports
 - ▲ Distinct physical ports
 - ▲ 1 shared physical port
- ▲ Time stamps have to be drawn from a common clock
 - ▲ Independent hardware time stamping modules
 - ▲ Independent control loops
- ▲ Redundant Synchronization allow to select one PTP feed to adjust the clock
- ▲ Selection Criteria
 - ▲ Availability ... All messages are received correctly
 - ▲ Consistency ... All messages are exchanged at their respective expected rates
 - ▲ Accuracy
 - ▲ BMCA
 - ▲ Quality of time information using statistical information,



PTP Monitoring

Its tedious, but the **ultimate** key to success

- ▲ Use **all** available channels/methods
 - ▲ **Both** in-band and out-of-band
- ▲ PTP V2.1 offers several cool methods
 - ▲ Receiver Event Monitoring, Enhanced Sync Accuracy Metrics, Performance Monitoring
- ▼ **Do not** rely on the PTP Receiver data alone: Its view of the world is very **limited**
- ▲ Monitor both during deployment and operation (24x7)



Undetected Error Conditions and Attack Scenarios

They do **exist** and some of them are quite **nasty**...

Unreliable Time Information

- ▶ **No** time information altogether
 - ▶ Transient or permanent failures
- ▼ **Poor Quality**

Wrong time information

- ▶ **Misconfigured** devices
 - ▶ PTP is **always** a multi-vendor deployment ...
- ▼ **Deliberate attacks**


Let's secure PTP and be done with it!?

- ▶ Standard encryption techniques (MACSEC, IPSEC) may significantly deteriorate the accuracy
 - ▶ **Dedicated** devices required for the **whole** network!
 - ▶ There is no need to encrypt PTP, time is no secret ...

- ▼ **PTP DoS – Denial of PTP Service**
 - ▼ Swamp all nodes with PTP packets
- ▼ **Pose as the VERY BEST Master**
 - ▼ Take over the network
 - ▼ Tamper with time (introduce jumps, slow time, ...)
 - ▼ Stop sending time information while still sending Announce messages
- ▼ **Man in the middle/ time delay attack**
 - ▼ Delay packets (unidirectionally and/or randomly)
- ▼ **Tamper with the GNSS Reference**
 - ▼ Jamming
 - ▼ Spoofing

Make Use of Redundancy Whenever Possible

Multiple network paths, Multiple networks, Multiple references, ...




Highly Resilient PTP Time Transfer in a Nutshell


A multi-pronged approach at work

- ▲ Provision a **sufficient** number of primary references
 - ▲ Ideally not collocated
- ▲ Deploy modern GMs capable of detecting GNSS based attacks
- ▲ Make use of existing network **redundancy**
 - ▲ Redundant paths in networks
 - ▲ Fully redundant networks
 - ▲ HSR – High availability Seamless Redundancy
 - ▲ PRP – Parallel Redundancy Protocol

PTP V2.1 Security TLV



- ▲ Deploy PTP Security (This is **NOT** the one-size-fits-all solution!)
- ▲ **Most** error/attacks can be **prevented**
- ▲ **All** Errors/attacks can be **detected**



▲ **Monitor, Monitor, Monitor, Monitor, Monitor, Monitor, Monitor, Monitor** ...