

WSTS – 20 May 2020

# Time Security

## The Winding Path to Deployment



Karen O'Donoghue  
Director, Internet Trust Technology  
[odonoghue@isoc.org](mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org)


# Time ↔ Security

Security was historically not a high priority of the network time synchronization community...

- But this has changed...
  - Increasing interconnection and decentralization
  - Increasing evidence of the impact of inadequate security
  - Interdependency between security and time
  - Legal and Compliance requirements



# Attacks are occurring...


INSIDER Sign In | R

Home > Network Security

NEWS

## Attackers use NTP reflection in huge DDoS attack

The attack peaked at over 400Gbps, according to CloudFlare, the company whose infrastructure was targeted




**By Lucian Constantin**  
Romania Correspondent, [IDG News Service](#) | FEB 11, 2014 12:25 PM PT

Attackers abused insecure Network Time Protocol servers to launch what appears to be one of the largest DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks ever reported, this time against the infrastructure of CloudFlare, a company that operates a global content delivery network.

The attack [was revealed Monday on Twitter](#) by Matthew Prince, CloudFlare's CEO, who said that it's "the start of ugly things to come" because "someone's got a big, new cannon."

### MORE LIKE THIS

NTP reflection: Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who's the DDoS'iest of them all?



Attackers abuse exposed LDAP servers to amplify DDoS attacks

Update: Spamhaus hit by biggest-ever DDoS attacks



# Vulnerabilities are being discovered...

## Recent Vulnerabilities

### February 2018 ntp-4.2.8p11 NTP Security Vulnerability Announcement

The NTP Project at Network Time Foundation is releasing ntp-4.2.8p11.

This release addresses five security issues in `ntpd`:

- LOW/MEDIUM: [Sec 3012](#) / [CVE-2016-1549](#) / [VU#961909](#): Sybil vulnerability: ephemeral association attack
  - While fixed in ntp-4.2.8p7, there are significant additional protections for this issue in 4.2.8p11.
  - Reported by Matt Van Gundy of Cisco.
- INFO/MEDIUM: [Sec 3412](#) / [CVE-2018-7182](#) / [VU#961909](#): `ctl_getitem()`: buffer read overrun leads to undefined behavior and information leak
  - Reported by Yihan Lian of Qihoo 360.
- LOW: [Sec 3415](#) / [CVE-2018-7170](#) / [VU#961909](#): Multiple authenticated ephemeral associations
  - Reported on the `questions@` list.
- LOW: [Sec 3453](#) / [CVE-2018-7184](#) / [VU#961909](#): Interleaved symmetric mode cannot recover from bad state
  - Reported by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.
- LOW/MEDIUM: [Sec 3454](#) / [CVE-2018-7185](#) / [VU#961909](#): Unauthenticated packet can reset authenticated interleaved association
  - Reported by Miroslav Lichvar of Red Hat.

one security issue in `ntpq`:

- MEDIUM: [Sec 3414](#) / [CVE-2018-7183](#) / [VU#961909](#): `ntpq:decodearr()` can write beyond its buffer limit
  - Reported by Michael Macnair of Thales-esecurity.com.

and provides over 33 bugfixes and 32 other improvements.

ENotification of these issues were delivered to our Institutional members on a rolling basis as they were reported and as progress was made.



# Research is occurring...

## Preventing (Network) Time Travel with Chronos

Omer Deutsch, Neta Rozen Schiff, Danny Dolev, Michael Schapira

School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

omermaya@gmail.com, neta.rozenschiff@mail.huji.ac.il, danny.dolev@mail.huji.ac.il, schapiram@huji.ac.il

**Abstract**—The Network Time Protocol (NTP) synchronizes time across computer systems over the Internet. Unfortunately, NTP is highly vulnerable to “time shifting attacks”, in which the attacker’s goal is to shift forward/backward the local time at an NTP client. NTP’s security vulnerabilities have severe implications for time-sensitive applications and for security mechanisms, including TLS certificates, DNS and DNSSEC, RPKI, Kerberos, BitCoin, and beyond. While technically NTP supports cryptographic authentication, it is very rarely used in practice and, worse yet, *timeshifting attacks on NTP are possible even if all NTP communications are encrypted and authenticated.*

was designed many decades ago and without security in mind. NTP’s design thus reflected the presence of inaccurate clocks, which was expected to be fairly rare, as opposed to malicious adversaries. Consequently, NTP is vulnerable to attacks, ranging from time shifting to time travel, which can affect clocks on victim clients.

In a nutshell, NTP is an NTP-client periodical pool of servers. Selecting

Paper from NDSS 2018. (<https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2018/programme/#02A>)



Image courtesy of Wes Hardaker



## Multiple causes of these security problems...

Flaws in  
configuration and  
implementation

Weaknesses in  
the actual  
protocol itself

Lack of adequate  
security  
mechanisms



And yet...

We had not had an updated specification for time  
synchronization security in 8+ years.

Until 2020!



## IEEE approach to the problem...

PTP Integrated Security Mechanisms (Prong A)

External Transport Security Mechanisms (Prong B)


Architecture Guidance (Prong C)

Monitoring and Management Guidance (Prong D)






# IEEE PTP Integrated Security Mechanism (Prong A) – The AUTHENTICATION TLV



## IETF approach to the problem...



# Network Time Security (NTS)

 Datatracker Groups Documents Meetings Other User

Document search

## Network Time Security for the Network Time Protocol

draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp-28

Status IESG evaluation record IESG writeups Email expansions History

Versions0001020304050607080910111213141516171819202122232425262728

draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp000102030405060708091011121314151719202228

Mar 2015Jul 2015Oct 2015Dec 2015Feb 2016Mar 2016Sep 2016Oct 2016Mar 2017Jun 2017Oct 2017Mar 2018Jul 2018Aug 2018Oct 2018Dec 2018Feb 2019Apr 2019Jul 2019Jan 2020

Document

TypeActive Internet-Draft (ntp WG)

Last updated2020-04-09 (latest revision 2020-03-25)

StreamIETF

Intended RFC statusProposed Standard

Formats

plain textxmlpdfhtmlizedbibtex

Reviews

SECDIR Last Call Review (of -23): Has Issues

GENART Telechat Review (of -23): Ready

GENART Last Call Review (of -22): Ready with Issues

OPSDIR Last Call Review - due: 2020-02-28

Stream

WG stateSubmitted to IESG for Publication

Document shepherdKaren O'Donoghue

Shepherd write-up

Show

 (last changed 2019-11-07)

IESG

IESG stateRFC Ed Queue

NTS Approved by IESG in March 2020!



# Basic phases of NTS secured NTP




Diagram courtesy of Martin Langer, Ph.D. student,  
Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences, Germany.

# NTS secured NTP system components




Diagram courtesy of Martin Langer, Ph.D. student,  
Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences, Germany.

# NTS Key Exchange phase




Diagram courtesy of Martin Langer, Ph.D. student, Ostfalia University of Applied Sciences, Germany.

# NTS Extension Fields for NTP




Diagram courtesy of Martin Langer,  
Ph.D. student, Ostfalia University  
of Applied Sciences, Germany.

## Recent basic interoperability testing

IETF 104/105 Hackathon results						
	NTS/NTP server					
NTP/NTS client		Ostfalia	NTPsec	Chrony	Netnod	Cloudflare
	Ostfalia	works	works	works	works	break
	NTPsec	works	works	works	works	works
	Chrony	works	works	works	works	works
	Netnod	works	works	works	works	---
	Cloudflare	cert issues	works	break	works	works

Note: This table represents the results of two specific test event and may not reflect current operational status.





It's time to focus on the road to deployment...



Technology / Standards Development

Preliminary / Prototype Implementations

Interoperability Testing

Production quality open source implementations

Commercial products

Tools for testing and troubleshooting

Preliminary deployments

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

Large scale deployments



# Internet Society Time Security Project

## Building a community

- Network operators
- Time service providers
- Enterprise IT groups

## Maturing the products

- Distributed multi-party testbed
- Virtual test events
- Test and measurement tools

## Developing deployment guidance


- Lessons Learned and Best Current Practices
- Monitoring Tools

## Expanding deployment

- Outreach
- Training



<https://www.internetsociety.org/issues/time-security/>



# It is Time to Act!

- The NTS for NTP specification is technically finished (in the final editing steps).
- Discussions are underway in IEEE 1588 to specify NTS for PTP.
- Prototype implementations and testing are underway.
- It is time to build solutions, test deployments, and gather lessons learned.
- Contact me if you want to participate in any of these activities: [odonoghue@isoc.org](mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org)





# Resources

## NTP Working Group

- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/ntp/about/>

## NTS Specification

- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp/>

## IEEE 1588 Working Group

- <https://ieee-sa.imeetcentral.com/1588public/>

## Recent NTS Blog Posts:

- <https://weberblog.net/network-time-security-new-ntp-authentication-mechanism/>
- <https://www.netnod.se/time-and-frequency/network-time-security>
- <https://www.netnod.se/time-and-frequency/how-to-use-nts>
- <https://blog.cloudflare.com/secure-time/>



# Thank you.

Karen O'Donoghue  
Director, Internet Trust Technology  
[odonoghue@isoc.org](mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org)

Rue Vallin 2  
CH-1201 Geneva  
Switzerland

Rambla Republica de Mexico 6125  
11000 Montevideo,  
Uruguay

Science Park 400  
1098 XH Amsterdam  
Netherlands

11710 Plaza America Drive  
Suite 400  
Reston, VA 20190, USA

66 Centrepont Drive  
Nepean, Ontario, K2G 6J5  
Canada

3 Temasek Avenue, Level 21  
Centennial Tower  
Singapore 039190

[internetsociety.org](http://internetsociety.org)  
[@internetsociety](https://twitter.com/internetsociety)

